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Capital City Bank, by and through its counsel, Watkiss & Campbell, submits this 
Brief of the Respondent in accordance with the rules of this Court. 
JURISDICTION OF COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
granted by this Court on June 12, 1989. The statutory basis for the grant of certiorari is 
stated in Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989). 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted 
summary judgment if favor of Capital City Bank, and against Michael Landes and others. 
Michael Landes and others appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Utah Supreme 
Court. On July 23, 1987, this Court poured-over the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. On January 12, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). 
A Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on January 31, 1989. 
On March 2, 1989, Michael Landes filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, which was granted by this Court on June 12, 1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issues Presented 
1. Whether this appeal was rendered moot by the assignment of the interest of 
the Small Business Administration in the absolute unconditional guaranty of Michael 
Landes to Capital City Bank. 
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2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals and the Third Judicial District Court 
abused their discretion in failing to require the joinder of the SBA in this action, pursuant 
to Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard of appellate review of failure to join a party under Rule 
19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is whether the lower courts abused their discretion. 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assoc, Inc., 728 
P.2d 1017 (1986). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. executed a note in favor of Capital City Bank, and 
in which note the Small Business Administration (SBA), an agency of the United States 
of America, was participating. Michael Landes executed an absolute unconditional 
guaranty, in favor of Capital City Bank and SBA, of the note of Bagel Nosh 
Intermountain, Ltd. payable to Capital City Bank. Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed 
a petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Bagel Nosh Intermountain, 
Ltd. and Michael Landes defaulted in their obligations under the note and guaranty to 
Capital City Bank. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Michael Landes commenced an action in the Third Judicial District Court against 
Capital City Bank seeking to be discharged of his obligations under the absolute 
unconditional guaranty executed by him in favor of Capital City Bank and SBA. Capital 
City Bank answered the complaint and counterclaimed against Michael Landes for 
enforcement of the absolute unconditional guaranty for judgment to collect all sums due 
and owing under the note in favor of Capital City Bank. After discovery was conducted 
by Michael Landes, Capital City Bank moved for summary judgment to dismiss all claims 
of Michael Landes against Capital City Bank and for judgment on the absolute 
unconditional guaranty of Michael Landes for all sums due and owing under the note. In 
response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Capital City Bank, Michael 
Landes argued that joinder of the SBA was required. 
Disposition in Court Below 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, 
granted summary judgment in favor of Capital City Bank, stating that joinder of the SBA 
was not required. Michael Landes appealed the decision of the Third Judicial District 
Court. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Third Judicial District 
Court, opining that although the District Court failed to state findings demonstrating that 
it had applied the proper analysis for determining the appropriateness of joinder under 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the error was harmless because joinder of the 
SBA was not required. 
3 
Statement of the Facts 
1. On December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. (Inc.), a New York 
Corporation, executed a note solely in favor of Capital City Bank in the principal sum of 
$300,000.00 (hereinafter "Note"). Complaint, paragraph 5, ROA at 3; Complaint, Exhibit 
A, ROA at 13; Answer, paragraph 5, ROA at 25; Counterclaim, paragraph 2, ROA at 28; 
Counterclaim, Exhibit 1, ROA 35; Answer to Counterclaim, paragraph 2, ROA at 67; 
Memorandum Decision of Third Judicial District Court, ROA at 310. 
2. The Small Business Administration (SBA) is a participant in the Note. Note, 
ROA at 106; Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 11, ROA at 187. 
3. The Note is governed by applicable federal law. Note, ROA at 106. 
4. On December 24, 1979, Michael Landes, Appellant herein, executed an 
absolute, unconditional and personal guaranty, of the Note, in favor of SBA and Capital 
City Bank (hereinafter "Guaranty"). Complaint; paragraph 7, ROA at 4; Complaint 
Exhibit 13, ROA at 20; Answer, paragraph 7, ROA at 25; Counterclaim, paragraph 7, 
ROA at 29; Counterclaim, Exhibit 3, ROA at 40; Answer to Counterclaim, paragraph 7, 
ROA at 68; Memorandum Decision of Third Judicial District Court, ROA at 310; Partial 
Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, paragraph 1, ROA at 396. 
5. On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Complaint, paragraph 11, 
ROA at 5; and Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 11, ROA at 25. 
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6. Landes, as a guarantor, made payments to Capital City Bank on the Note, 
between November 29, 1984 and December 27, 1985, during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceeding of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. Complaint, paragraph 14, ROA 
at 5; Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 14, ROA at 25; and Affidavit of M.A. Allem, 
paragraph 15, ROA at 187. 
7. The obligations of Michael Landes, under his Guaranty, have been in default 
since at least January 25, 1986. Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 16, ROA at 187. 
8. The last payment on the Note to Capital City Bank was December 27, 1985. 
Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 17, ROA at 188. 
9. On March 11, 1986, Michael Landes, Appellant herein, and others, 
commenced an action, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, against Capital City Bank, Respondent herein, requesting, inter alia, that the Court 
declare the Guaranty to be void and of no effect and discharging Michael Landes from 
any obligation to Capital City Bank under the Guaranty. Complaint, ROA at 2-21. 
10. The Small Business Administration (SBA) was not named as a defendant by 
Michael Landes in the Complaint. Complaint, ROA at 2-21. 
11. Capital City Bank is the legal holder of the Note and Guaranty and was 
authorized by the SBA in writing to sue upon the Note and Guaranty and accelerate the 
maturities thereof. Supplemental Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraphs 5 and 6, ROA at 
251-252. 
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12. On April 1, 1986, Capital City Bank filed an Answer and Counterclaim to 
the Complaint requesting, inter alia, judgment against Michael Landes for the balance due 
and owing under the Note, in accordance with the terms of the Guaranty. Answer and 
Counterclaim, ROA at 24-45. 
13. On April 24, 1986, Michael Landes served Plaintiffs First Set of Request 
[sic] for Admissions and Interrogatories on Capital City Bank. Certificate of Service, ROA 
at 65. 
14. On May 27, 1986, Capital City Bank timely served its responses to Plaintiffs 
First Set of Request [sic] for Admissions and Interrogatories. Certificate of Service, ROA 
at 73-74. 
15. On July 25, 1986, Capital City Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
to resolve all issues in the Complaint and the Counterclaim. Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ROA at 100-102. 
16. On October 27, 1986, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Capital 
City Bank was heard before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson and the matter taken 
under advisement. Minute Entry, ROA at 307. 
17. On February 4, 1987, after legal research and a careful review of the 
evidence, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered 
a Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment in favor of Capital City Bank on all 
causes of action and against Michael Landes, and others, on all causes of action. 
Memorandum Decision, ROA at 308-314. 
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18. On May 20, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, executed a Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in favor of 
Capital City Bank on all causes of action, and against Michael Landes, and others, on all 
causes of action. Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, ROA at 395-401. 
19. On January 12, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming 
the Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 
1989); ROA at 517-522. 
20. On June 12, 1989, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Michael Landes. ROA at 524. 
21. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Michael Landes presents three 
issues for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, as follows: 
1. "Did the Appellate Court err in failing to enforce the mandatory 
joinder of a necessary party required by Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." 
2. "Did the Appellate Court err in deciding that as a matter of law a 
[sic] obligee who authorizes a co-obligee to enforce their joint claim 
is not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." 
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3. "Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the District Court's 
failure to properly analyze the issue of joinder under Rule 19, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, was harmless error." 
Petition for Certiorari, p.l; ROA at 529. 
22. On October 6, 1988, the Small Business Administration (SBA), by and 
through its authorized official, assigned all of its right, title, and interest, if any, in the 
Guaranty to Capital City Bank. Affidavit of Stan Nakano, attached to Respondent's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 
of Michael Landes (Suggestion of Mootness) as Exhibit A and Affidavit of M.A. Allem, 
attached to Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion 
to Dismiss the Appeal of Michael Landes (Suggestion of Mootness) as Exhibit B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point 1 
All issues of this appeal relate to whether the SBA should have been joined in this 
action in accordance with Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The issues of joinder 
are predicated upon the fact that the SBA is a named beneficiary of the Guaranty 
executed by Michael Landes. At the request of Capital City Bank, the SBA transferred 
to Capital City Bank all of the legal right, title, and interest of SBA in the Guaranty of 
Michael Landes, thereby resolving the issues of whether the SBA should be joined in this 
action. Because the SBA is no longer named in the Guaranty executed by Michael 
Landes, the requested relief of joinder of the SBA is meaningless, ergo, moot. 
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Point 2 
Neither the District Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals abused their discretion 
by refusing to join the SBA in this action. An abuse of discretion occurs when the lower 
court acts in a manner so clearly outside of reason that is capricious and arbitrary. Action 
is arbitrary or capricious when no reasonable person would espouse the decision of the 
court. Although the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that the District Court failed to 
enter findings to support its conclusion that joinder of SBA was not required. However, 
the Utah Court of Appeals found the error to be harmless because it concurred with the 
District Court that the SBA need not be joined in this case. Because the decisions of the 
District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals were not arbitrary or capricious and 
reasonable persons concur in those decisions, neither court abused its discretion in 
concluding that joinder of SBA was not necessary. 
Point 3 
The first step in an analysis of joinder under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is to determine if the party proposed to be joined is necessary. Michael Landes 
assumes, and never argues, either facts or law to support his position that the SBA is 
necessary to this action. A careful reading of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
discloses that the decision of that Court was that the SBA was not a necessary party, 
because that Court used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" interchangeably. To be 
necessary, the absent party must have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case. The 
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SBA does not have a legal interest in the outcome of this case and, therefore, is not 
necessary. 
Point 4 
A court must find that a party is necessary to an action prior to determining 
indispensability. If a party is not necessary to an action, then the absent party is not 
indispensable. Because the SBA is not a necessary party to this action, it can not be an 
indispensable party to this action. 
Point 5 
Michael Landes hypothesizes and speculates that the SBA has a claim against him 
based upon the Guaranty executed by him. The only claim fathomable is a claim of the 
SBA to require Michael Landes, under the Guaranty, to pay Capital City Bank the balance 
due and owing under the Note. Only Capital City Bank is entitled to collect funds under 
the Note. The general law of real party in interest does not apply to negotiable 
instruments. The legal holder of a negotiable instrument is entitled to collect the 
instrument notwithstanding actual ownership of the instrument. Accordingly, the SBA may 
assert no claim against Michael Landes, through enforcement of the Guaranty, to collect 
the Note. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The Issues of This Appeal are Moot Because of the 
Assignment from SBA to Capital City Bank. 
The three issues, upon which this Court granted certiorari, each focus on whether 
the SBA should have been joined as a party to this action because the absolute 
unconditional Guaranty is issued in favor of both Capital City Bank and the SBA. The 
interest of the SBA in the absolute unconditional Guaranty was assigned to Capital City 
Bank in an effort to resolve the issue of joinder, terminate this litigation and eliminate the 
suggestion of double liability as hypothesized by Michael Landes. 
As stated by this Court: 
An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances 
change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief 
requested impossible or of no legal effect. Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development, 659 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1983). 
If this Court were to determine that the SBA should have been joined in this proceeding, 
then joinder would be superfluous because of the assignment of the interest of SBA in the 
absolute unconditional Guaranty to Capital City Bank. Joinder of the SBA at this time 
would be of no legal effect upon these proceedings, which satisfies the standard of 
mootness articulated by this Court: 
If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the 
case is moot and a court will normally refrain from hearing it on the merits. 
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981). 
Michael Landes argues, in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss 
for mootness, that the assignment does not resolve the issues before this Court because 
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Michael Landes is entitled to assert claims against SBA. However, the District Court has 
finally adjudicated, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, that Michael Landes has no 
defenses under the absolute unconditional Guaranty. Therefore, remand for joinder of 
SBA would not affect the rights of the litigants. 
Furthermore, the Guaranty provides that Michael Landes will pay the obligations 
of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. to Capital City Bank under the Note. The only relief 
that the SBA could request is for Michael Landes to pay the obligations of Bagel Nosh 
Intermountain, Ltd. under the Note to Capital City Bank as if Michael Landes were the 
direct obligor thereunder. The Guaranty does not provide either Capital City Bank or 
SBA the right to collect the sums due and owing under the Note, but solely the right to 
require Michael Landes, as the guarantor, to pay all sums due and owing under the Note 
as if he were the direct obligor thereunder. Accordingly, any claim that Michael Landes 
may have against the SBA would not be subject to offset in this proceeding. No purpose, 
either legally or equitably, is served by the joinder of the SBA due to the assignment of 
the interest of SBA in the Guaranty from SBA to Capital City Bank. Thus, this appeal 
is moot. 
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Point 2 
Neither the District Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals 
Abused Their Discretion in Failing to Require 
the Joinder of the SBA in This Action. 
This Court must determine whether the lower courts abused their discretion in 
failing to require the joinder of the SBA in this proceeding. Bonneville Tower v. Thompson 
Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). This Court has stated that: 
[The Supreme Court] will not interfere with matters of discretion or upset 
the actions of the lower tribunal except upon a showing that the tribunal 
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside of reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. Peatross v. Board 
of Com'rs of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976). 
The District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals possessed the authority to refuse 
to join the SBA as a party to this action. Michael Landes has not disputed the authority 
of the lower courts, but has argued that the decision reached by those courts was 
erroneous. It seems difficult to extend the argument of Michael Landes to state that the 
District Court acted "in a manner so clearly outside of reason that its action must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary11 when a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals has reached 
the same conclusion. 
Other courts have further elaborated the definition of an abuse of discretion. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Kansas has ruled: 
Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or 
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only 
where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. 
If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the 
trial court then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Kan. Dept. of Transp., 671 P.2d 511 (Kan. 
1983)(citations omitted). 
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Although the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed with the approach used by the District 
Court to analyze the joinder issue, each court concluded that the SBA need not be joined 
in this action. Accordingly, the District Court and the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
did not abuse their discretion in denying the request for joinder of the SBA. 
Point 3 
The SBA is Not a Necessary Party, Under Rule 19(a). 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that the first analysis under Rule 19, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is to determine "whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the 
action to make it a necessary party." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah 
App. 1989)(citation omitted). Michael Landes agrees with the first step of the analysis 
outlined by the Utah Court of Appeals. Brief of Appellant, p. 13. Michael Landes 
concludes that because the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the SBA was not an 
indispensable party, "the Appellate Court implicitly recognized SBA's status as a necessary 
party under Rule 19(a)." Brief of Appellant, p. 14. Based upon the interpretation of 
Michael Landes, implicitly assuming that SBA is a necessary party, Michael Landes leap 
frogs the issue of whether the SBA is a necessary party, which he acknowledges is the 
threshold step of the analysis. Michael Landes does not advance any argument, either 
legal or factual, that the SBA is a necessary party or discuss the issue. 
A careful reading of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reveals that the 
terms "necessary" and "indispensable" were used interchangeably in the opinion. For 
example, the section of the opinion addressing this issue is entitled "RULE 19 
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INDISPENSABLE PARTIES." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App. 
1989). The factual analysis applied by the Utah Court of Appeals, after stating the 
appropriate legal analysis, focuses on whether the SBA had a sufficient interest in the 
action to make it a necessary party. The Utah Court of Appeals applied the undisputed 
facts in the record to the individual criteria outlined in Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In particular, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed whether Michael Landes 
would be subjected to multiple liability and whether the SBA could assert a claim against 
Michael Landes. The Utah Court of Appeals did not address the factors set forth in 
subsection (b) of the rule relative to whether a party is indispensable. 
A careful review of the analysis of the Utah Court of Appeals leads logically to the 
conclusion that the Utah Court of Appeals used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" 
interchangeably and intended to state that the SBA was not a necessary party when it 
stated that the SBA was not an indispensable party. Because all obligations of the Note 
run in favor of Capital City Bank, the SBA does not have a sufficient legal interest to be 
a necessary party. Accordingly, the SBA is not a necessary party to this action. 
Point 4 
The SBA is Not an Indispensable Party to This Action. 
The argument of Michael Landes, that the SBA must be joined because it is subject 
to service of process, is predicated upon the implicit assumption that the SBA is a 
necessary party. The analysis of whether a party is indispensable is dependent upon a 
finding that the party is necessary. See, Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Michael Landes relies upon the decisions in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (1984) 
and Intermountain Phy. Med. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1987) to 
support his position that the SBA should have been joined as an indispensable party. 
However, in each of those cases, the absent party was determined to be necessary, 
Michael Landes also states that the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is "in 
direct contradiction to this Court's decision in Hiltsley." Brief of Appellant, p. 12. In 
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), this Court reversed a judgment in favor of 
a nonparty to the action for lack of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to join that 
party as a necessary party to the action. It is unclear why the decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals in this case is in conflict with that decision, because in that case this Court 
determined that the absent party was necessary. Because the SBA is not a necessary party 
to this action, it can not be an indispensable party. 
Point 5 
SBA Cannot Assert Claims Under the Note 
Against Michael Landes. 
It is undisputed that the SBA is a participating lender with Capital City Bank in the 
Note. The last paragraph of the Note clearly states that the SBA is or will participate in 
the loan and therefore provides for its enforcement in accordance with applicable federal 
law. Note, ROA at 106. See also, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 
87 L.Ed.2d 838 (1943) (Federal law governs issues relative to the federal program of the 
SBA). The record clearly states that the SBA is a participant in the Note to the extent 
of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance of the Note. Affidavit of M.A. 
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Mem, ROA at 187. Under applicable federal law, the SBA, as a participant in the Note, 
can look solely to Capital City Bank, the lead lender, for satisfaction of its claims because 
the SBA is not itself a creditor of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., the obligor under the 
Note, and cannot assert creditor claims against Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., the 
borrower. Hibernia Nat Bank v. F.D.I.C, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984). 
The general rule of real party in interest, as outlined by Rule 17, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, does not apply in the context of negotiable instruments. Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-3-301 (1980). Section 3-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
The holder of an instrument whether of not he is the owner may transfer or 
negotiate it and, except as otherwise provided in section 70A-3-603 on 
payment or satisfaction, discharge it or enforce payment in his own name. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-301 (1980). 
Accordingly, Capital City Bank, as the holder and sole payee under the Note is entitled 
to enforce payment and discharge the Note in its own name, regardless of whether or not 
Capital City Bank is the owner of the Note. 
Although federal law governs, in the absence of a federal rule, state law may be 
adopted as the proper federal rule under appropriate guidelines. United States v. Kimbell 
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-740, 59 L.Ed.2d 711, 723-732 (1979); and United States v. 
New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1986). In the absence of a 
federal rule, section 3-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code may be applied in this 
context because it is a uniform law which has been adopted in each of the fifty states of 
the United States, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
Virgin Islands without variation or modification. Accord, United States v. Lattauzio, 748 
17 
F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1984). See, [State Correlation Tables] U.C.C.Rep.Serv. (Callaghan) 
(1989). 
Accordingly, Capital City Bank, as the holder of the Note, is the only party entitled 
to enforce and discharge the Note. Although the SBA may have an ownership or 
equitable interest in the Note, it does not have a legal interest as a holder which is 
required in order to collect upon the Note. The SBA is not entitled to collect funds or 
assert claims under the Note. Therefore, the SBA may not assert claims, through 
enforcement of the Guaranty, against Michael Landes for collection of the Note. 
CONCLUSION 
All issues of this appeal relate to the joinder of the SBA as an indispensable party 
because the SBA was a named beneficiary under the Guaranty executed by Michael 
Landes. The SBA has assigned all legal right, title, and interest in the Guaranty of 
Michael Landes to Capital City Bank. Therefore, all issues of this appeal have been 
rendered moot. 
The standard of review to be applied by this Court, of a decision denying joinder 
of an absent party under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is whether the lower 
courts abused their discretion. If reasonable persons concur in the decisions reached by 
the lower courts, that joinder of the SBA is not necessary, then the lower courts did not 
abuse their discretion. Because the decisions of the lower courts were not arbitrary or 
capricious, those courts did not abuse their discretion. 
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Joinder of an absent party is not required unless the absent party is necessary to 
an action. To be necessary, the absent party must have a sufficient interest in the 
outcome of the case. The SBA does not have a legal interest in the outcome of this case, 
and, therefore, is not necessary to this case. 
An indispensable party, at a minimum, is a necessary party to the case. Because 
the SBA is not necessary to this case, it is not an indispensable party. 
Only Capital City Bank is entitled to collect funds under the Note. The Guaranty 
of Michael Landes assures payment of the Note. The general law of real party in interest 
does not apply to negotiable instruments. Capital City Bank as the legal holder of the 
Note is entitled to collect the Note notwithstanding actual ownership thereof. Accordingly, 
the SBA has no claim against Michael Landes. 
Capital City Bank respectfully requests this Court to dismiss this appeal as moot, 
or, in the alternative, to affirm the decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting the Partial Final 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 20, 1987, in favor of Capital City Bank 
and against Michael Landes. 
DATED this /O day of October, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Steven T. Waterman 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
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A D D E N D U M 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Seftel i Capital i IM Hunk ' ^ P M 'Ml 11 Uah App. 1989) 
Se/te/ w. Capital City Bank, Civil No. C-86-1810, Memorandum Decision, Tinson 
(February 4, l%7) 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim tor 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-<2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
SEPTEL v. CAPITAL CITY BANK Utah 941 
Cite M 767 ?2d 941 (UuhApp. 1989) 
Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, and 
Michael Landes, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, Counterclaimant, 
• . 
Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, Michael 
Landes, Utah State Tax Commission, 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, a Utah 
joint venture and general partnership, 
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah 
corporation, and Olympus Hills Shop-
ping Center, LTD., a Utah limited part-
nership, Counterclaim Defendants. 
No. 870312-CA. 
Court ot Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied January 31,1989. 
Guarantors under note brought declar-
atory action against payee seeking order 
discharging them from obligations under 
the guaranties. Creditor counterclaimed to 
enforce guaranties. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Han-
son, J., granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of payee. Guarantors appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) 
colender was not an indispensable party to 
contract or tort designation of the cause of 
action rather academic Cf. Back v. Farmers' 
Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795, SO 1-02 (Utah 19S5) 
(comparing range of damages available in tort 
and contract). 
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the case, where there was uncontroverted 
evidence that colender had authorized lend-
er to sue on note and related guaranties, 
and (2) guarantors waived right, under 
guaranty agreement, to raise defense of 
impairment of collateral. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error *»187(3) 
Parties *»8<X1), 84(1) 
Party to a lawsuit may raise the issue 
of failure to join an indispensable party at 
any time in the proceedings, including for 
the first time on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 19(a). 
2. Appeal and Error *»1036(3) 
Trial court's failure to follow two-step 
analysis, required under procedural rule to 
determine if colender in a suit to enforce 
note guaranties was an indispensable par-
ty, was harmless error, where there was 
clear evidence supporting court's ultimate 
conclusion that colender was not indispens-
able party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 19. 
3. Contracts *»330(1) 
• a general contract rule, joint obli-
gees are deemed indispensable parties in a 
suit against obligor. 
4. Guaranty *»82(2) 
Colender under note was not indispens-
able party in action brought to enforce 
guaranties of note, where uncontroverted 
affidavit evidence from lender indicated co-
lender authorized suit on note and related 
guaranties and acceleration of their matur 
ties 
& Goaranty *•*> 
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his ac-
tions, impairs the value of collateral secur-
ing the underlying obligation, either abso-
lute or conditional, guaranteed by guaran-
tor, guarantor will be discharged from his 
obligation to extent of impairment 
6. Guaranty *»72 
Guarantors under loan agreement 
waived rights to assert defenses of impair-
ment of collateral or modification of under-
lying obligation, under terms of guaranty 
agreement, which provided for guarantors' 
consent to release or discharge of collateral 
and provided guarantors no recourse in the 
event of such actions. 
7, Guaranty **72 
Fhere was no evidence, in action to 
enforce guaranties of note, that lender's 
actions were "willful," so as to preclude 
waiver of impairment of collateral defense 
under guaranties relating to a Small Busi-
ness Administration financed loan. 
Daniel W. Jackson (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
David M. Connors (argued), LeBoeuf, 
Lamb, Leiby & McRae, Salt Lake City, for 
Landes 
Steven T. Waterman (argued), Herschei 
J. Saperstein, Marco B. Kunz, Watkiss & 
Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and 
ORMEf JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiffs/appellants, Sidney Seftel, 
Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes, 
("guarantors") appeal from the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissing their com-
plaint and granting defendant/respondent, 
Capital City Bank, ("Capital") judgment in 
the amount of $293,319.64 and issuing a 
decree of foreclosure. Guarantors seek a 
reversal of the trial court's order. We 
affirm. 
PACTS 
On December 24,1979, Bagel Nosh inter-
mountain, Ltd., ("Bagel Nosh") executed a 
note in favor of Capital in the principal 
amount of $800,000. Under the terms of 
the note, the Small Business Administra-
tion ("SBA") was a 90% participating lend-
er. The note also provides it is to be en-
forced in "accordance with applicable fed* 
eral law." 
As additional consideration for the loan, 
guarantors each executed unconditional 
personal guaranties. The guaranties were 
secured by trust deeds to real property 
SEFTEL v. CAPITAL CITY BANK 
CIUM767 ?2& 941 (UuhApp. 19tf) 
Utah 943 
0wnsd by guarantors and located at Snow-
bird A* P * * " ^ 6 8 w*re executed on 
SBA IOTTM in favor of both the SBA and 
Capital as "co-lenders." Specifically, the 
guaranties state: 
In order to induce Capital City Bank and 
SBA (hereinafter called "Lender'') to 
make a loan .. . to Bagel Nosh Inter-
mountain, LTD. (Inc.) . . . (hereinafter 
called the "Debtor"), the Undersigned 
hereby unconditionally guarantees to 
Lender, . . . the due and punctual pay-
ment when due, . . . of the principal of 
and interest on and all sums payable . . . 
vrith respect to the note of the Debt-
or. . • • 
The Undersigned waives any notice of 
the incurring by the Debtor at any 
time of any of the Liabilities, and 
waives any and all presentment, de-
mand, protest or notice of dishonor, 
nonpayment, or other default with re-
spect to any of the Liabilities — The 
Undersigned hereby grants to Lender 
full power, in its uncontrolled discre-
tion and without notice to the under-
signed ... , to deal in any manner with 
the Liabilities and the collateral, in-
cluding, . . . the following powers: 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any 
terms of all or any part of the Liabili-
ties . . . to grant any extension or re-
newal thereof . . . and to effect any 
release, compromise or settlement with 
respect thereto; 
(d) To consent to the substitution, ex-
change, or release of all or any part of 
the collateral.... 
The obligations of the Undersigned 
hereunder shall not be released, dis-
charged, or in any way affected, nor 
shall the Undersigned have any rights 
or recourse against Lender, by reason 
of any action Lender may take or omit 
to take under the foregoing powers. 
On March 30, 1988, following several 
months of nonpayment, Bagel Nosh and 
Capital entered into a Loan Restructure 
Agreement ("Agreement") modifying the 
terms of the original note. The Agreement 
was signed by Sidney Seftel and provided 
in relevant part-
Capital . . . agrees to modify the terms 
of the loan agreement dated December 
24, 1979, between [Capital] and [Bagel 
Nosh] under the following conditions: 
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes 
personally guarantee [Capital's] loan 
to the Borrower. Each is personally 
liable for the entire indebtedness to 
[Capital].... 
6. Any item in the loan agreement dat-
ed December 24, 1979, that is not spe-
cifically modified by this loan restruc-
ture agreement remains in full force. 
Guarantors complied with the terms of 
the Agreement and made several payments 
thereunder. 
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed 
a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. On March 11, 1986, 
guarantors filed this action for declaratory 
relief requesting the trial court to dis-
charge them from any obligations under 
their personal guaranties on the grounds 
that Capital, (1) willfully impaired the col-
lateral originally pledged to secure the 
note, (2) recklessly lost their security, and 
(3) substantially modified guarantors' obli-
gations underlying the guaranties by the 
Loan Restructure Agreement 
Capital counterclaimed requesting the 
trial court to declare the guaranties and 
corresponding trust deeds valid enforceable 
obligations. Capital further requested a 
judicial decree of foreclosure on the trust 
deeds. 
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion 
for summary judgment on the issues in 
guarantors' complaint and Capital's coun-
terclaim. Capital claimed the note, Agree-
ment, and guaranties were all in default 
Capital argued the guaranties were en-
forceable, thus, they were entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law because, (1) pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (1978), 
as holder of the guaranties, Capital was 
entitled to enforce them, (2) guarantors by 
prior judicial admissions were estopped 
from denying liability, and (3) under the 
express provisions of the guaranties, guar-
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antors waived the detVns^i ^A furth in 
their complaint 
In support of its motion for summary 
judgment, Capital submitted, among a 
number of documents, the affidavit of M.A. 
Allem, Capital's executive vice president 
In his affidavit, Mr. Allem states in perti-
nent part that the "SBA is a participating 
lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel 
Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) 
of the outstanding unpaid balance." 
On September 5, 1986, Capital filed the 
supplemental affidavit of Mr Allem which 
stated: 
5. Capital City is entitled to sue upon 
the loan instruments including acceler-
ation of the maturity of the note and 
guaranties provided Capital City has 
obtained the written consent of SBA. 
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the 
note and guaranties involved in this 
action, and Capital City has not trans-
ferred the note or guaranties to SBA 
and has been authorized in writing by 
SBA to sue upon the note and guaran-
ties 
On September 11, 1986, guarantors filed 
their memorandum in opposition to Capi-
tal's motion for summary judgment claim-
ing for the first time that the SBA was an 
indispensable party, and thus must be 
joined in order for Capital to enforce the 
guaranties. 
On February 4, 1987, the trial court is-
sued its memorandum decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Capital on 
all issues in the complaint and counter-
claim. Guarantors appeal this order. 
! 
RULE 19—INDISPENSABLE PARTIES 
In its memorandum decision, the trial 
court found that Capital was entitled to 
enforce the guaranties and the SBA was 
not an indispensable party. Although we 
1. The portion of Utah RXiv.P. 19 upon which 
guarantors rely provides: 
A person .. . shall be joined as a party 
the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest in 
the subject matter and is so situated that his 
absence may . . . (ii) leave any of the persons 
find the trial court did not properly analyze 
the issue of whether the SBA is an indig. 
pensable party, we affirm the trial court's 
decision as we find based upon the undU-
puted facts in the record, the SBA is not 
as a matter of law, an indispensable party. 
Required Analysis Under Rule 19 
In its February 4th memorandum deci-
sion the trial court stated: 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an 
indispensable party, the Small Business 
Administration, has not been joined. 
That defense is without merit In the 
first instance, the defense has not been 
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not 
under the present interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure an indispensable par-
ty to this action. 
[1] Guarantors claim the trial court 
committed reversible error by permitting 
Capital to enforce the guaranties without 
making particularized findings pursuant to 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.1 While actual findings of fact were 
not strictly required as this matter was 
presented on a motion for summary judg-
ment, the guarantors' basic contention is 
well-taken. We note that Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules is substantively similar to its 
federal counterpart, see Utah R.Civ.P. 19 
compiler's notes, and in the absence of 
Utah authority, we resort to the more 
abundant federal case law for guidance. 
We also note that a party may raise the 
issue of failure to join an indispensable 
party at any time in the proceedings, in-
cluding for the first time on appeal. See, 
e.g„ Kroblin Refrigerated Xpreee, Inc. v. 
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 104 (3rd Cir.1986). 
Accordingly, this issue is properly before 
us. 
Ordinarily, a trial court's determination 
properly entered under Rule 19 will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
See, e.g., Bonneville Tower v. Thompson 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise in-
consistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest 
Utah R.CW.P. 19(a). 
SEFTEL v. CAPITAL CITY BANK 
CIUM767 PJW 94! (UtmhApp. 1999) 
Vicki* Assoc*., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah action is dismissed 
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New 
Utah 945 
1986); 
Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir.1987); 
Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th 
Cir.l982). Whether a party is indispens-
able to the action depend on a number 
0f factors all "varying wr.a the different 
cases, some such factors being substantive, 
some procedural, some compelling by them-
selves, and some subject to balancing 
against opposing interests." Provident 
Tradesmen* B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390 
U.S. 102, 119, 88 S.Ct 733, 743, 19 L.Ed.2d 
936 (1968).* 
[2] Federal authorities addressing the 
analytical requirements of Rule 19 uni-
formly require a court to follow a two-part 
inquiry. See, e.g., Ogalalla Land Ltd. v. 
Wexpro Co., 587 F.Supp. 453, 454 (D.Wyo. 
2984) (citing Wright v. First Natl Bank, 
483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973)). Pursuant to 
subsection (a), "a court must first deter-
mine whether an absent party has suffi-
cient interest in the action to make it a 
necessary party/' considering the criteria 
set forth in the Rule.3 Manygoats v. 
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.1977). 
If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is 
deemed ''necessary/' a court must then 
proceed to subsection (b), and determine 
whether the party is indispensable, consid-
ering four factors: (1) to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence 
will prejudice him or her or those already 
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or 
avoiding prejudice by protective measures 
or provisions in the judgment; (3) the ade-
quacy of the judgment which might be 
entered in the person's absence; and (4) the 
adequacy of UM plaintiffs remedy if the 
1 Pmviisnt is the landmark case interpreting 
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and it has been cited with approval in a number 
of Utah decisions. See, «.*, Hiltsky v. Ryder, 
73$ P.2d 1024, 102S n. 3 (Utah 1987); Stat* v. 
Toledo, 699 P.2d 710, 711 n. 4 (Utah 1985); 
Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist v. Price 
River Water Users Assoc, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 n. 
5 (Utah 1982). 
3. Utah RXiv.P. 19(a) identifies the criteria a 
court must consider when determining whether 
a party is necessary and provides: 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose 
for nonjoinder. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 19(b). See also Wright v. 
First Nat'l Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 
483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.1973). In light of 
these factors, the ultimate test under Rule 
19(b) is "whether in equity and good con-
science the action should proceed." Many-
goats, 558 F.2d at 558. 
Furthermore, abstract generalizations 
are not a substitute for the analysis re-
quired under Rule 19. Provident, 390 U.S. 
at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 745. 
The trial court in this action did not 
follow the analytical steps required by Rule 
19. The court failed to address the two-
step analysis set forth above to demon-
strate that the undisputed facts support its 
ultimate conclusion. Instead, the trial 
court merely stated that "the SBA is not 
under the present interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure an indispensable party 
to this action." Such conclusory state-
ments do not comply with the rule. See, 
e.g., Provident, 390 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct at 
745; Wright, 483 F.2d at 75. As the Court 
declared in Wright, "[t]hese conclusionary 
statements are of no value because the 
court finds no facts to support them." 483 
F.2d at 75. (the trial court in Wright 
stated "complete relief cannot be afforded 
the remaining parties for all the reasons 
set out in Rule 19"). 
However, a trial court's failure to follow 
the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harm-
less error, if, upon a review of the record, 
there is clear evidence to support the trial 
court's ultimate conclusion. See Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987). 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of action shall be joined 
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by rea-
son of his claimed interest 
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[3,4J As a general contract rule, joint 
obligees are deemed indispensable parties 
in a suit against an obligor. See, e.g., 
Brackin Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v. 
McLarty Farms, Inc, 704 P.2d 585, 586 
(11th Cir.1983) (a review of the case law 
reveals that the majority of courts hold 
joint Migees are indispensable); Harrell 
and Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody 
Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 
1977); Bry-Man's, Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d 
585, 587 (5th Cir.1963); Purcel v. Wells, 
236 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir.1956); Fremon 
v. W.A. Shea/fer Pen Co., 209 F.2d 627, 
633-34 (8th Cir. 1954); Hanna Mining Co. 
v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., 573 
F.Supp. 1395, 1399 (D.Minn. 1983). See also 
C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 1613 at 185-86 
(2d ed.1986). Joint obligees are ordinarily 
considered indispensable because "[ojbli-
gors have a 'right to stand upon their con-
tract and insist that they shall not be ha-
rassed with different actions or suits to 
recover parts of one single demand/" 
Bry-Mans, 312 F.2d at 587 (citation omit-
ted), (quoting McAulay v. Moody, 185 F. 
144 (CC.0re.1911)). 
Capital contends that the undisputed 
facts in the record demonstrate there is no 
possibility of multiple lawsuits because the 
SBA has no legal interest in and, therefore, 
cannot enforce the guaranties. Capital ar-
gues on appeal that the SBA is not a party 
to the underlying note and has not funded 
any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh. 
Furthermore, Capital claims that the SBA 
has given Capital written authorization to 
sue on the guaranties. Therefore, Capital 
claims the SBA is not, as a matter of law, 
an indispensable party. To support its alle-
gations Capital directs our attention to the 
affidavit of MJL Allem which states that 
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note 
and guaranties involved in this action and 
has been authorized in writing by the SBA 
to sue upon the note and guaranties and 
accelerate the maturity thereof." 
No objection was made below to this 
affidavit and no counter affidavit was filed, 
thus we accept the factual allegations as 
true on appeal. See Trimble Real Estate 
v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 456 
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Salt Lake City c0Tp 
v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.2d 49 
46 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, Mr 
Allem's affidavit establishes that the SBA 
has given Capital written authorization to 
sue upon the note and the guaranties, and 
thus, based on the undisputed facts before 
us is not an indispensable party. 
We do not, however, suggest that absent 
such authorization by the SBA, the SBA 
would necessarily be an indispensable p ^ 
ty. Although the guaranties expressly run 
to both Capital and the SBA, suggesting it 
first blush that both would be indispens-
able to any action seeking enforcement of 
the guaranties, the only obligation guana, 
tied is the $800,000 note, which is payaMs 
by Bagel Noeh solely to Capital So long 
as Capital is the holder of the note, as a 
matter of ordinary commercial law there m 
no obligation due under the note from Ba-
gel Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, as-
underlying obligation oi Bagel Noah wMcfc 
the guarantors can be said to have guana-
tied to the SBA. However, federal law and 
extensive federal regulation govern these 
transactions which might conceivably re-
quire a different analysis but one we need 
not reach in this case to find that the SBA 
is not an indispensable party as a matter of 
law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's determination. 
TT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
GUARANTORS' COMPLAINT 
To determine whether summary judg-
ment was properly entered, we employ the 
same analytical standard aa that of the 
trial court Because summary judgment 
deprives a party of its opportunity to 
present its case on the merits, we review 
the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the 
judgment was granted Atlas Corp. a 
Claris Natl Bank, 787 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). If, after a review of the record, we 
conclude that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, we must reverse the summary 
judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings on that issue. Id. 
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pjfat a careful review of the record in 
his cM*» w e conclude the guarantors have 
toted *° ra*se ^ e n u ^ e i s s u e s °f material 
fact and, as a matter of law, their defenses 
s t fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
part's order dismissing guarantors' com-
plaint. 
Impairment of Collateral 
[5-7] We first address whether guaran-
tors waived their right to assert the de-
fense of "impairment of collateral." Based 
on the express terms of the original guar-
anties dated December 24, 1979, we con-
clude guarantors waived this defense. 
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his ac-
tions, impairs the value of collateral secur-
ing the underlying obligation guaranteed 
by a guarantor, "either absolute or condi-
tional, the guarantor will be discharged 
from his obligation to the extent of the 
impairment" Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 
P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah CtApp.1987) (cita-
tion omitted). A guarantor may, however, 
expressly waive his or her right to raise the 
defense of impairment of collateral. Id. at 
109. See also Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 
1095, 1097 (Utah 1985); Heller v. United 
States Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, 
9 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
The provisions of the SBA guaranty 
agreements, signed by each of the guaran-
tors, expressly waive an impairment de-
fense: 
[Guarantors] . . . consent to the substitu-
tion, exchange, or release of all or any 
part of the collateral— 
The obligation of . . . [Guarantors] shall 
not be released, discharged, or in any 
way affected, nor shall the [Guarantors] 
have any rights or recourse against [Cap-
ital], by reason of any action [Capital] 
may take or omit to take under the fore-
going powers. 
This language is clear and unequivocal. 
Guarantors have expressly consented to a 
waiver and release of their rights in the 
collateral. The Tenth Circuit, interpreting 
the identical provisions of an SBA guaran-
ty, has similarly held that this provision 
amounts to a waiver by guarantors of their 
right to claim impairment of collateral. 
See United States v. New Mexico Land-
scaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 84&-47 (10th 
Cir.1986). 
We are not persuaded by guarantors' 
allegations that Capital acted "willfully." 
We are mindful that parties to an SBA 
guaranty do not waive an impairment of 
collateral defense where the acts of a lend-
er are deemed "willful." See New Mexico 
Landscaping, 785 F.2d at 847-48. In or-
der to demonstrate the requisite "willful-
ness" "a guarantor must allege more than 
'gross neglect of a known duty/ " Id. at 
848. "A guarantor . . . must allege 'a pur-
pose by the [Lender] to diminish the value 
of the security in order to intentionaUy 
injure the defendants/ " Id. 
Guarantors in this action have not al-
leged in their original complaint such a 
purpose by Capital, nor did they submit 
affidavits to support such a position. 
Thus, we find no error in the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment on their 
impairment of collateral defense. 
Reckless Loss of 
Security/Modification of Obligation 
We further find guarantors' remaining 
defenses, reckless loss of security and mod-
ification of the underlying obligation were 
properly dismissed Guarantors have 
failed to demonstrate that Capital did not 
maintain a perfected security interest in 
the collateral at all relevant times. Fur-
thermore, even if guarantors could identify 
some technical transgression in Capital's 
security interest, the language of the guar-
anties previously identified in this opinion 
clearly constitute a waiver of said trans-
gressions. 
Finally, we reject guarantor!' conten-
tions that they are discharged from their 
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v by reason of the Loan Restruc-
— _ Once again, the clear and 
unaquisoeal language of the guarantiee 
empower* Capital "to modify or otherwise 
change any terms of all or any part" of the 
agreement 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
Capital. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA 
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-1810 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, et al., 
Counterclaim Defendants, 
Before the Court is defendant and counterclaimant Capital 
City Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. The interested parties 
through their counsel appeared and argued their respective posi-
tions. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the Memoranda of Points and Authori-
ties submitted by the parties, and to conduct further legal 
research. The Court has now had the opportunity to carefully 
review and consider the arguments and legal authorities cited 
SEFTEL V, CAPITAL CITY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
by the parties, review the supporting attachments and affidavits 
if the parties :onduct independent research on the applicable 
v. H i"t > i I" e i < j ' i •' 11 e r w i s e 1 u 1L y a d v i s e d , enters 
I he following Memorandum Decision. 
-«,,- --:.* defendant and counterclaimant: capital 
• - has moved for Summary Judgment 
n p l a i n t i f f s ' Compla * seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
Complair^ .*? \ matter -:f law. Capital has also moved for Si immary 
. .sim against plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendants, including the plaintiff, the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Crossroads Plaza A s s o c i a t e s , Y on ng E ] e < : t r I c SI q n <V" omp a ny a nci 
„/r„- ..i Shopping Center, Ltd., seeking from the plaintiffs 
~e amounts claimed due on their individual guarantees, and 
an O r d e r of foreclosi.ii «, on l" he f t mst d e e d al i^ s>iie Kid for 
a further Order declaring that the Interests of Capital are 
superior to the claims, if any <-* the remaining counterclaim 
def endartc' i »• i t : "omm J S S L OII , C r o s s r o a d s "Plaza 
Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. 
Tl - lies I'lirnl .it nuiTittiil Si I im tlliis Cii.se h a v e b e e n c a r e f u l l y 
b r iefed counsel, and therefore the Court does not undertake 
to review the authorities applicable to the va: 
T1 I E p3 a I nti f £ s f Comp 1 aint a 1 ] eges against Capital its 
first cause < action that Capita] has breached the guarantee 
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agreement executed by the plaintiffs in favor of Capital. The 
guarantees were made in furtherance of a note and trust deed 
executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., (hereinafter "Bagel 
Nosh") in which the plaintiffs were principals. The guarantees 
are absolute, unconditional and personal as to each plaintiff 
in favor of Capital. Bagel Nosh has filed a voluntary Chapter 
XI Bankruptcy Petition. The issues in this case are governed 
by federal law in accordance with the agreements between the 
parties. Federal law is dispositive of the plaintiffs1 first 
cause of action in that under applicable federal decisions from 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals the plaintiffs do not have 
an actionable claim for unjustifiable impairment of collateral. 
The Court is further of the opinion that even if Utah law was 
applicable, no breach can be shown, all as more particularly 
set forth by Capital in its Memoranda, the argument on which 
the Court finds persuasive on those issues. 
The plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges reckless 
loss of a security interest. The materials submitted clearly 
show that Capital perfected its security interests in the col-
lateral. It further appears that plaintiffs' claim is again 
based upon Utah law which is not applicable under the agreement 
between the parties. Under federal law, Capital has no duty 
to maintain or perfect a security interest in the collateral 
in that the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that defense. 
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As the record is clear that Capital has in fact protected its 
security interests, even if Utah law were applicable, Capital 
has complied. 
Plaintiffs' third cause of action alleges that the guarantees 
are of no affect, because the underlying obligation was modified. 
Under the terms of the guarantees, modifications have been authorized 
in advance by the plaintiffs/guarantors. Certainly, the modifica-
tions which are in actuality more favorable to the plaintiffs/ 
guarantors cannot be complained of at this point by the guarantors 
where they have paid under the guarantee since the default of 
the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and if not estopped at this 
point, have impliedly given their consent to modification. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived the defense 
regarding modification, and if they have not so waived that 
defense through the guarantees, they are estopped and have otherwise 
consented to the modification. 
The allegations of "material issues of fact remaining" 
by the plaintiffs are without merit. The claimed factual issues 
either do not actually exist, or if they do exist, they are 
not material and substantial so as to require this Court to 
deny Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the plaintiffs have executed 
unconditional guarantees in favor of Capital to induce a loan 
to their company, Bagel Nosh. Bagel Nosh has defaulted, and 
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Capital is entitled to resort to the guarantees which the plaintiffs 
originally made. 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, 
the Small Business Administration, has not been joined. That 
defense is without merit. In the first instance, the defense 
has not been pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable 
party to this action. 
As to the remaining counter defendants, Utah State Tax 
Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign 
Company, and the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., to the 
extent that they assert interests in the properties that Capital 
seeks to foreclose, those interests are inferior to Capital's. 
The Court concludes that Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
both as to the plaintiffs' Complaint, and as to Capital's Counter-
claim should be granted, and that there are no material questions 
of fact existing, and that the defendant and counerclaimant 
Capital is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. 
For the purposes of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's Motion on all the 
bases alleged by Capital in its moving papers and supporting 
documents, with the exception of the claims of laches, which 
the Court determines would require a further hearing, and are 
not ripe for Summary Judgment. 
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Counsel for Capital is 
with this Memorandum Decision 
of the Utah Rules of Civil 
and submit the same in accordance 
for the Court's review and signatu 
Dated this i^ day of 
Order in accordance 
with Rule 52(a) 
the bases granted, 
Rules of Practice 
?IHOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HJNDLEv 
By $SJJ£^U£T>*^^ 
Deputy Q&* 
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